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to disclose information about the
rental situation.
Additionally, the court also
dismissed Legg's argument that the
Castruccios had a duty, under the
deceptive business practices
doctrine, to warn her of what would
happen if she did not pay her utility
bills. It determined that such a duty
rightly belonged to the utility
company. Moreover, the court also
dismissed Legg's contention that the
Castruccios' statement that "they
would take care of it" meant Legg
was not responsible for the upstairs
tenants' share of the utility bill. The
court ruled that this statement was
simply a response to Legg's request
for separate utility meters.

Claim fails test
Legg then asserted that, in
violation of the CPA's proscription of
unfair business practices, the
Castruccios conditioned her continued tenancy on whether she accepted the burdens and liabilities of
having other tenants' utility usage
on her meter. In deciding this issue,
the court employed the FTC's test for
unfair business practices, finding it
consistent with the goals and
philosophy of the CPA. According to
this test, an "unfair business
practice" is one that is substantial, is
not "outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers
or competition that the practice

produces", and causes "injury that
consumers themselves could not
have reasonably avoided."
Applying the FrC test, the court
dismissed Legg's unfair business
practices claim. It found that Legg
could have reasonably avoided
injury by moving out of the apartment. Moreover, considering her
month-to-month lease and the
availability of similar apartments in
the area with separate utility
metering, Legg could have done so
with relative ease. Corrective action,
the court explained, is only necessary to deter seller behavior that
effectively prevents a consumer
from making her own decisions.
Please see "Utility expenses" on page 36

Minnesota statutes protect rent-to-own customers
ByAimee Latimer
In Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 544 (Minn.
1994), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that rentto-own transactions are consumer credit sales as
defined by the Minnesota Consumer Credit Sales Act
("CCSA"), sections 325G. 15 and 325G. 16 of the

Minnesota Statutes. It also held that such transactions
are subject to the interest rate limitations of the state's
general usury statute. Furthermore, the supreme court
found that the Rental-Purchase Agreement Act
("RPAA"), sections 325F.84 to 325F.98 of the Minnesota
Statutes, did not repeal the CCSA but rather provides
remedies, that in conjunction with the CCSA, are
cumulative.

Rent-to-own customers pay more
D.E.F. Investments, Inc. ("DEF") and its subsidiaries
operate several rent-to-own dealerships in Minnesota.
DEF uses standard forms to lease a variety of consumer
goods to its customers. Under these contracts, a
customer agrees to rent an item on either a weekly or
monthly basis. At the end of the selected term, the
customer has the option to renew the contract. Addi-
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tionally, if the customer has renewed the contract for a
specified number of terms, she obtains title and ownership of the item. In such cases, the total rental price
exceeds the fair market value price of the item.
Delilah Miller and Craig Stenzel each entered into
rent-to-own agreements with DEF that extended over
several years. Miller signed a DEF agreement for a used
washer and dryer with a stated purchase price of
$800.75. According to her contract, she could acquire
ownership by making either 16 monthly payments of
$84.40 for a total purchase price of $1,350.40, or 69
weekly payments of $21.10 for a total purchase price of
$1,455.90. Stenzel signed a similar contract for a
television with a market value of $470. According to
the terms of his contract, Stenzel could obtain ownership by making either 18 monthly payments of $47.70,
totaling a purchase price of $858.60, or 78 weekly
payments of $12.75, totaling $994.50.
On April 7, 1992, Miller and Stenzel filed a classaction lawsuit in state court against DEF. In their
complaint, they alleged that: (1) DEF's rent-to-own
agreements were consumer credit sales as defined by
the CCSA; (2) DEF violated the CCSA by failing to treat

the agreements as consumer credit sales; and (3) DEF
committed usury in violation of the state's usury statute.
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Subsequently, Miller and Stenzel moved for partial
summary judgment, requesting a declaratory judgment
that DEF'S contracts constituted credit sales. DEF then
moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court
to dismiss the usury claim.
The district court certified the plaintiff class and
granted its motion for partial summary judgment,
declaring that rent-to-own contracts constituted
consumer credit sales. The court also granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs on the usury claim, reserving
the amount of damages for the trier of fact.
After granting discretionary review, the court of
appeals reversed the district court. It found that DEF'S
rent-to-own agreements were neither consumer credit
sales nor usurious. Additionally, the appellate court
suggested that the recently enacted RPAA substantially
conflicted with the CCSA and that the RPAA was controlling. Miller and Stenzel then appealed to the Minnesota
Supreme Court.

Court defines rent-to-own agreements
On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court first
considered whether the CCSA defined rent-to-own
agreements as consumer credit sales. The court noted
that at common law, rent-to-own transactions were
treated as leases, rather than sales. This was because
the customer was never bound to pay the total purchase
price of an item and could terminate the "lease" at any
time by returning the item. The supreme court suggested that the state legislature indicated its intent to
move away from this rule and subject such terminable
leases to consumer credit sales protection laws when it
amended the CCSA in 1981. This amendment defined
certain terminable leases as a "sale of goods" if the
contracts met three criteria: (a) the bailee or lessee has
the option to renew the contract by making the payments specified in the contract, (b) the contract obligates the bailor or lessor to transfer ownership of the
property to the bailee or lessee for no other or a
nominal consideration upon full compliance by the
bailee or lessee to renew the contract, and (c) the
payments contracted for by the bailee or lessee,
including those payments pursuant to the exercise of an
option by the bailee or lessee to renew the contract, are
substantially equivalent to or in excess of the aggregate
value of the property and services involved.
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Turning to the case at hand, the court found that
DEF'S rent-to-own contracts satisfied each of the above

requirements and therefore constituted a "sale of
goods." Furthermore, it held that such transactions were
consumer credit sales because the buyer was not
required to make full payment when acquiring possession of an item, but could pay for it over a period of
time. Moreover, the court stated that the term "credit"
must be interpreted liberally to further the goal of the
CCSA, which is consumer protection. It concluded that
the legislature, in amending the Act to include the
definition of certain terminable leases as "sales,"
intended for these transactions to be protected under the
CCSA.

Company violated usury law
The Minnesota Supreme Court then addressed the
issue of whether DEF violated Minnesota's usury law.
On its behalf, DEF argued that its rent-to-own transactions were not usurious because the first two common
law elements of usury, forbearance of debt and an
absolute obligation to repay a principal amount, were
not involved in the disputed contracts. Furthermore,
DEF contended that the rent-to-own customer neither
incurred any debt nor was required to pay a principal
amount.
Although the court agreed with DEF's assertions, it
nonetheless concluded that DEF'S transactions were
usurious. It declared that by amending the CCSA to
define rent-to-own agreements as consumer credit sales
for all purposes, the Minnesota legislature intended to
extend to rent-to-own consumers the same benefits of
consumer protection laws, including the usury statute,
extended to those who entered into ordinary credit
agreements or installment sales plans. The court stated
that rent-to-own agreements were analogous to
ordinary credit agreements "in that they must either
forfeit possession of a good or continue paying for it."
Therefore, the first two elements of common law usury
were met by operation of statute under the CCSA.

Additionally, the court found that the third and
fourth elements of common law usury, charging an
excessive rate of interest and intending to "evade the
law at the inception of the transaction," were also met
in the present case. DEF acknowledged the large
difference between the price its customers paid to
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purchase goods through the rent-to-own agreements
and the actual value of the goods. However, it argued,
that it offered services, such as free delivery and
maintenance, which justified the higher cost, and this
presented a factual issue as to whether it charged
excessive interest. The court, however, found that DEF
offered no real evidence of the value of such services.
As a result, the court concluded that no reasonable
factfinder would find that the large disparity between
the prices DEF charged and the value of the goods and
services DEF offered fell within the amount allowed by
the usury statute.
Addressing the fourth element of usury, the court
stated that while DEF did not intend to violate the usury
law, it did intend to charge an excessive rate of interest,
which is all that is required by the statute. Therefore,
the supreme court concluded that that lower court
correctly found no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether DEF violated the usury statute and therefore
properly granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs
on their usury claim.
RPAA

and CCSA offer choice of remedies

Finally, DEF contended that the RPAA, enacted in
1990, effectively repealed the CCSA. In analyzing this

issue, the supreme court examined both the language
and legislative history of the RPAA and concluded that it
did not expressly repeal the CCSA. In so ruling, the court
noted in particular that the RPAA that stated that the
remedies offered "shall not be construed as restricting
any remedy that is otherwise available." The court also
observed that while the legislature had considered
repealing the CCSA and had even included such wording
in the original statute, it later adopted amendments that
deleted such provisions. Because the legislature did not
expressly state its intent to repeal the CCSA or restrict
the consumer's remedies to those listed in the RPAA, the
court held that the plaintiffs were not barred from
seeking a remedy under the CCSA. Furthermore, the
court did not find that the two laws were in irreconcilable conflict with one another. Rather, it held that the
two laws could be interpreted to offer cumulative
remedies for consumer protection.
In concluding, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that all rent-to--own transactions must be treated as
consumer credit sales, as defined by the CCSA, and that
rent-to-own customers were entitled to statutory
protections. It affirmed summary judgment for the
plaintiffs and remanded the case to the trial court for the
determination of damages.

Lanham Act does not cover consumer claims
By Travis Ketterman
In Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp.,
Inc., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1993), the
Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
held that consumers do not have
standing to bring false advertising
claims under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Additionally, the court held that the
1988 amendment to the Lanham Act
did not broaden its jurisdiction to
include consumer claims.
The Lanham Act, as enacted in
1946, regulates and protects
trademarks; in addition, it protects
persons engaged in commerce from
the "deceptive and misleading use of
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the marks." The 1946 statute
provided a cause of action for
persons engaged in commerce when
another person knowingly uses false
advertising in the merchandising of
goods and services. In 1988,
Congress modified Section 43(a) to
authorize "any person who believes
that he or she is likely to be damaged by such acts" to bring a cause
of action under the Lanham Act in
federal court. In a consolidated
appeal, the Third Circuit addressed
whether the original Lanham Act, or
its more recent modification, was
sufficiently broad to give standing to
consumers who did not assert any
commercial interest or injury.

In 1990, Sara Serbin and George
Baker purchased new automobiles in
separate transactions. At the time of
these purchases, each also purchased
a "Super Rust Protection" policy
from the defendants, Ziebart
International Corporation and
Ziebart Company (collectively
referred to as Ziebart). Subsequently, Serbin and Baker brought
suit against Ziebart in the U.S.
District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, alleging
that defendants' advertisements
about "Super Rust Protection"
contained false representations
which misled them into purchasing
the additional policy. Moreover, they
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